Inauguration Session Welcome Address by Nusrat Mirza Chairman Rabita Forum International
Dr. Ansar Parvez,
Mr. Khalid Banuri,
Ambassador (R) Najmuddin Shaikh
Teachers and taught
Ladies and Gentlemen
It is my proud privilege to welcome you in this prestigious seminar of national and international interest. As, one can judge from the very title of it that Pakistan’s nuclear technology has been used in the fields of Health, agriculture and producing energy, for the betterment of the people. Dr. Ansar Parvez has been very active in these humanitarian works, while he was Chairman Atomic Energy Commission and present Chairman Scientist Muhammad Naeem has also dedicated to the service of mankind and all activities of PAEC has been monitored by IAEA. Dr. Ansar Parvez is such a nice and competent person that he was elected Chairman of International Atomic Energy Agency. I am thankful to him that the great son of Pakistan has accepted our request to be the Chief Guest and key-note speaker.
This Seminar has two more sessions: first one shall deal with Pakistan’s Peaceful nuclear technology. This session shall be chaired by another respectable personality Ambassador Najmuddin Shaikh who had been Pakistan’s Ambassador to UNO and had been Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. He has rendered very valuable services to Pakistan. I am personally thankful to him that he is travelling abroad to night, still he has consented to chair the First session. In second session, the learned scholars shall discuss the politics of Nuclear Suppliers group (NSG), a new Arena of difference/Conflict in the world politics. This session shall be chaired by Air Commodore® Khalid Banuri one the fine man and son of this soil who has served the country without coming in the lime light. He is just retired from the position of Director General Arm Control and Disarmament Affairs. He has shown kindness to accept invitation to preside over second session; a very rare public appearance. I am obliged that still some people care relations and understand the cause. I am highly thankful to our learned Speakers: Prof. Dr. Talaat Wizarat, a well known personality. Dr. Zafar Ali Yousufzai, Director General Strategic Export Control Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Haleema Saadia a researcher: Prof. Dr. Tanweer Khalid a senior political scientist, Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal of international repute in Strategic affairs and Dr. Rizvana Abassi , a scholar and author of books and articles on strategic issues. My thanks are for our professors and Head of Departments of different Universities; Karachi University, Federal Urdu University from all science departments, IOBM, Preston University and others. Today, a large numbers of professors and Doctors are gathered under this roof as seminar is very unique. The senior students of IR and Political Science are also here to enhance their knowhow. A team of new generation scholars and researcher is being prepared by Rabita Forum international to understand Security, strategic and Geopolitics issues. In future, Rabita Forum international may serve as full fledge think tank. Grateful to Diplomats and excellences who have are spare their valuable time to attend this seminar. I am personally thankful to our media friends who are present.
I am grateful to you, ladies and gentlemen
Last but least, I am thankful to Rabita Forum International team who has worked hard as usual to make this seminar a success. A few words for Rabita Forum international. It is purely a Pakistani Organization which is addressing strategic issues and find out solution and any activity against our national interest has been checked. Some of negative activities are checked very successfully. You can judge our services going through our brochure which is every one’s hand. I can summarize just to refresh you. The intellectuals and experts of Pakistan out rightly rejected pressure to sign on Fissile Material Cut off Treaty in our seminar on 3rd May 2012 at Islamabad. The professors and intellectuals declared that there is no major threat by nuclear power plants K2 & K3 to environment and safety of Karachi. The rest one can be judged going through our brochure in your hands. Once again thank you very much to you ladies and Gentlemen.
Dr. Ansar Parvez
Advisor Nuclear Power – National Command Authority, Former Chairman PAEC
Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and South Asian Stability
‘Pakistan must add 35,000 megawatts to national grid by 2030’
Former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr Ansar Parvez said on Tuesday that Pakistan must add 35,000 Megawatts (MW) of additional electricity if it is going to maintain the economic growth rate up to 6 percent or above by 2030. Also, he urged the government to pursue further option of nuclear power plants to cope with the power challenges, as the country has good track record of safe and successful operations of nuclear energy for more than four decades. Addressing as chief guest during the opening session of a seminar titled ‘Pakistan Peaceful Nuclear Technology and Politics of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)’ here at a hotel he said nuclear energy has no environmental impact, there is no carbon emissions neither any threat to the climate change. He said the radiations which come out of nuclear power plants during normal operation are very small. The event was organised by Rabita Forum International, a platform for promotion of social cultural and intellectual activities in Pakistan and abroad. “As the incumbent government sees a 5.8 percent economic growth in the next financial year, but it cannot go without ensuring adequate power supply to the industries,” Ansar said. He hopped that in 2018, there would be no load shedding, but he said one must understand that the existing power demand is a ‘suppressed’ demand because there are no industries being set up due to power crisis. But once the load shedding finishes and energy is supplied this demand will increase and the suppression will go away and the demand will go up much more. The electricity growth should be at 1.5 percent of the gross domestic production (GDP), otherwise, it would not be possible to get any growth in GDP. The nuclear scientist said Pakistan should have an installed capacity of 55,000 MW of electricity to maintain economic growth rate in the next thirteen years. “We have to invest in future by pursuing Pakistan’s nuclear programme,” he said. We have to ensure the nuclear power plants operate well with high capacity factor and operate safely. We also have to make sure that we can provide security for the entire programme claiming our rightful place among the respected few countries that use nuclear programme not only for civil purposes but the defense purposes. Recalling he said, Pakistan had established its first nuclear power plant, Kanupp, in 1972 and more than 45 years of its safe operation has provided confidence to the country to further the option of nuclear power plants, he said. The problem is that the capital cost of nuclear energy is very high but it’s offset by the fact that its fuel cost is very low. The Chernobyl incident took place in 1986. World health report estimated no more than 15 to 20 people lost their lives due to release of radiations. However, the basic lesson that the world learned from this incident was operator trainings in nuclear power plants. Many organisations were setup in the world and Pakistan too reemphasis on operator trainings on so many occasions. Also design charges were made so as to decrease the probability of the incident. Sharing a US data he said a person’s likelihood of dying in a car accident in United States is one in 48,000, while chances of the person’s dying in lightning is one in 14000, whereas probability of the K-II and K-III power plants after their latest design is one in 10, million, he said.
Session – 1
Ambassador (R) Najmuddin Shaikh
Former Secretary Foreign Affairs of Pakistan
Pakistan must prepare itself and should strive to receive the same waiver that India secured for itself as a non NPT country in 2008. We are eligible for NSG membership and the biasness has made it a matter of controversy. The spokesperson for Chinese ministry of foreign affairs was asked about China’s position at NSG next meeting under Swiss presidency. Chinese spokesperson stated categorically that China’s stance remains unchanged as it believes that the basic criteria for membership of non NPT countries into the NSG should be determined first. Once this criterion has been determined and approved, China will talk about country specific requirements. There is little prospect of India being granted membership of NSG. As despite it is not just China that opposes Indian entry into NSG but there are other member states as well. In its defense, India argues that it deserves to be a NSG member just as France was made a member when France had not signed the NPT. Secondly, as it is an export control regime, being an NPT signatory should not be that important a criterion for its membership. These arguments aren’t gaining much weight, and there are many other countries apart from china that are against granting India membership to NSG. US view of India was not created recently, in fact; it has been present for quite some time. India has been in America’s graces for quite a while now. It was mentioned by one of the speakers that America expects to get economic benefit from its delas with India as these deals may create as many as twenty seven thousand jobs. This, however, is not possible as Westinghouse (owned by Toshiba) declared bankruptcy, and Toshiba itself is in a very bad state. Apart from this Indians have announced that they are constructing 10 nuclear power plants of 700 MW indigenously, which means that no new contracts or deals in this regard will be made in the future. Commercial benefits of any civil nuclear deal do not exist for the West; however, the geo strategic benefits exist.
It was Henry Kissinger’s pressure that stopped us from acquiring reprocessing plants from France.
Fact of the matter is that Pakistan is still far away from acquiring the capacity of indigenously producing a nuclear reactor. We have an agreement under which China has provided us with Chashma 2&3 and K2 and K3. Chinese said on an open forum that K2 and K3 will not be operational in Pakistan unless it has been tested in China first, despite of being produced jointly, as it is a new technology. We need the NSG because we currently have only one source of acquiring nuclear power plants and that too for a limited time. Even if we get a waiver for NSG we are lagging behind when it comes to financing nuclear power plants, as they are expensive.
Dr. Talat A Wizarat
Center of Policy and Area Studies Social Science Institute of Business Management Karachi
Topic:- Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology – Pakistan’s Case
Use of Nuclear energy is seen as a taboo by masses and it is feared greatly despite of its multiple peaceful uses. This is because the world has seen the destructive capability of nuclear weapons as displayed by America when it used them against Japan. We have a large pool of young people, but we lack the means to provide them jobs and means to secure a livelihood due to which they may become a liability rather than a benefit. One of the our biggest challenge at the moment is developing sources of energy.Our energy requirements are high and production is very low due to which we suffer. Every government makes promises to curb load shedding in a matter of few years and assures that it has taken steps which will benefit the next government. World is moving towards renewable energy but these sources are not very reliable. For instance, sunlight may become restricted in a place or wind power may not be enough to produce energy. In Japan garbage is being burnt to produce energy for heating and other purposes. Nuclear energy is a viable alternative energy option and Pakistan has potential and a good portfolio to make it work. We have good security measures which rival global standards. It requires a lot of investment in the beginning, however, with time that cost is reduced.
Germany and japan has been dependent on it and even India intends to use it in a big way.
Due to a recent incident in Japan, environment lobbies have become very active. Civil nuclear plants in Karachi were opposed to K2 and K3 as they believe that a nuclear plant may prove to be devastating if a natural disaster strikes and that these plants may increase exposure to radioactivity. These people need to be convinced through dialogue. We need to work on food, water and energy security. According to an estimate, 50% of the food we produce either goes to waste or it is destroyed. We need to develop safe ways to preserve food. Nuclear energy serves as a viable option for food security against pests and nuclear material can make soil fertile. People are concerned that using nuclear energy for food production might have adverse effects and scientists need to convey to the people that it is not so. Nuclear technology is beneficial in terms of medicine. It helps in identifying tumors and their size. Use of nuclear technology in medicine has many advantages. Firstly it helps in measuring the size of objects from a distance whether the size of a tumor is required to be determined or depth of water is required. It helps in Maintaining isotopes which can be used for peaceful purposes and it has a favorable cost benefit ratio.
Dr. Zafar Ali Yousufzai
DG Strategic Export Control Division Minsitry of Foreign Affairs
Topic :- Non-Proliferation and Technology Control Measures
NSG Evolution and Membership Issue
The author is on the visiting faculty of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) has expressed the desire to constructively contribute to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons and to the goals of non-proliferation on the basis of equality and partnership with the international community and, has stated that Pakistan was keen to join the four export control arrangements. The decision to seek membership of the international export control regimes i.e. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG), and Wassenaar Arrangement (AG) reflects Pakistan’s strong support for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. More recently, Pakistan has taken three significant steps i.e. a) offering bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to India b) ratification of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and c) declaring adherence to the NSG Guidelines.
NSG Brief History & Importance
In May 1974, India conducted nuclear tests using plutonium produced by the Canadian supplied CIRUS reactor with heavy water provided by the US though the understanding was that this would be used for peaceful purpose only. This was a big blow to the NPT and revealed that technology provided for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons programme. “This necessitated the creation of an alternate arrangement that would regulate nuclear trade more strictly” and thus came the NSG in 1975, a grouping of 48 countries including the five Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) who are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Aim of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without hindering international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field. NSG has a set for rules for admission of new members called “Factors for Participation” that a prospective candidate State is required to meet, which includes the ability to supply nuclear related items, adherence to a set of NSG guidelines, membership of the NPT and other major non-proliferation international treaties and/or regional/international agreements like membership of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), and a legally based domestic export control system. However, application of the criteria has remained subjective. It is an informal (political) arrangement, the decisions are not legally binding, has a set of guidelines for exports of WMD related and dual use items, decisions are based on consensus but allow national discretion in implementation. It has closed or restrictive membership and no undercut policy. NSG works on the system of rotating chairmanship and holds annual plenary meeting for taking policy decisions. There is neither any formal means of identifying violation by a member State nor an institutionalized means of sanctions for such violations. There is also lack of information sharing within these regimes and their consensus based decision making process impedes bringing changes that are necessitated by the rapid technological developments and changing proliferation modes.
Current Debate in the NSG – Two Step Approach for NSG Membership
NSG is at a critical juncture and Participating Governments (PGs) bear a heavy responsibility to maintain its credibility as a rule based organization rather than a grouping that is driven by commercial and political considerations of few major powers. Back in 2008, the US used its political and diplomatic influence and pressured even arm twisted reluctant countries for a positive decision on granting waiver to India, from the NSG’s full scope safeguards as a condition of supply. However, trends in NSG are now different. PGs are more vocal and they have publically declared their position, which makes it difficult to back track. There is a clear divergence of views within the NSG to deal with the issue of participation of non-NPT States. The June 2016 Seoul plenary, ended without any outcome on the membership issue of non-NPT applicants i.e. India and Pakistan. However, PGs agreed to continue discussions on legal, technical and political aspects of the issue of non-NPT States’ membership. Since then the debate has focused attention on criteria for admission of non-NPT States in the export control regime. NSG’s governing document ‘Procedural Arrangements’ sets out NPT as one of the ‘factors for participation.’ Many PGs have supported a two step approach for participation of non-NPT applicants i.e. to set criteria with a view to establishing NPT equivalence and thereafter judge the applicants against the criteria agreed by the PGs, as part of the second step. There is a clear divide, few PGs are of the view that no non-NPT state should be admitted unless it accedes to the NPT as NNWS, in contrast the US and other countries supporting India, advocate the 2008 waiver and the subsequent separation plan, IAEA safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol (AP) signed by India in 2009, as sufficient basis for considering its membership. These States disregard India’s reluctance and utter failure to meet the agreed benchmarks. Many NSG PGs are cognizant of the idea of two step approach. Discussions on the first step have begun and at least one informal meeting of PGs was held in November 2016 but there was no outcome. Without an open ended discussion and exhausting debate on the first step with a view to developing consensus on tangible non-proliferation standards that are applied simultaneously across the board and without selectivity, the regime risks its credibility as a principled based organization and lends itself to creating another big dent in the non-proliferation architecture.
The 2008 Exemption
The 2008 exemption granted to India, was a game changer, which enabled India to clinch civil nuclear cooperation agreements with over a dozen countries and allowed it access to advance nuclear technology. This has, not only spared its indigenous resources for enhancing and modernizing its nuclear weapons but also allowed it to divert imported materials & technology for military usage. Unabated fissile material production would result in an arms race between India and China on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other, thus igniting destabilizing tendencies in the region. It is understandable that in the changing geo-political landscape of the region, India is being bolstered as counter weight to China. But non-proliferation regimes should be more inclusive and should not create any exceptions. Discriminatory policies based on subordinating principles to politics will weaken international non-proliferation institutions and may fuel arms races. The proliferation implications of the exceptions in the Indian safeguards agreement defy the spirit of NPT and IAEA safeguards i.e. non-diversion of material intended for peaceful uses to military purposes. Separation plan agreed with the IAEA has not been not fully implemented. Eight civilian power reactors, Fast Breeders Reactors, fuel cycle and other facilities are outside safeguards. Close links remain between military and civilian programme exist and scientific knowledge can be used for enhancing and refining military capabilities. There is no change in India’s opposition to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Contrary to the spirit of the commitment, India has not ceased the production of fissile material for military purposes. In fact, huge new facilities for enrichment are being established in Karnataka and elsewhere outside the IAEA safeguards.
Pakistan, the NSG and Strategic Export Controls
Pakistan has a long history of engagement with the NSG. This engagement has taken a more structured form over the last few years. Pakistan consolidated its export control regime when it promulgated export control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their means of Delivery Act-2004. Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) was created as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an Oversight Board was set up to provide policy directions and monitor implementation of the Act. Since then, decisions and commitments have led to national actions, promoted international cooperation and fostered an export controls culture. National Control Lists, licensing and enforcement rules and policy guidelines on strategic export controls were notified. Control Lists of dual use goods are periodically revised by an inter-ministerial joint working group. These lists and policy guidelines on strategic export controls are in complete harmony with the international best practices and the lists and guidelines followed by the NSG and other international export control regimes.Policy guidelines on strategic export controls require requisite IAEA safeguards on all relevant materials (NPT Article III.2) and support the goal of a nuclear weapon free world through the commencement of negotiation on nuclear disarmament at the CD (NPT Article VI). Pakistan has a complete programme of harnessing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the years, Pakistan has built an extensive nuclear infrastructure for contributing to the socioeconomic uplift of the country. It has nuclear power plants, complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, research reactors, agriculture and biotechnology research centers, medical and oncology centers, and also industrial applications of nuclear technology.Pakistan has more than four decades experience in safe, secure and safeguarded operation of nuclear power plants. Its application to participate in the NSG therefore, stands on solid grounds of technical experience, capability and well established commitment to nuclear safety and security. Pakistan is a fossil fuel deficient country and; is compelled to increase the percentage of clean energy including nuclear energy, in the national energy mix. The Energy Security Plan envisages nuclear power generation of 40,000 MWe by 2050, to meet acute energy short fall, which offers opportunities for international cooperation under the IAEA safeguards.
The issue of NSG cannot be separated from the consideration of strategic stability in the region. The bedrock of nuclear order ‘Deterrence’ is getting more complex and faces severe challenges due to discriminatory policies and exceptions that override accepted international norms. Factors undermining regional stability include the induction of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, increasing conventional asymmetry, refusal to engage in dialogue and above all the resort to find space for limited war under the nuclear overhang. This is accentuated by the adoption of offensive war fighting doctrines and contemplation of comprehensive counterforce strikes. Because of its growing relations with the US, India has become increasingly dismissive of Pakistan’s overtures for maintaining peace and stability. Pakistan would like to constructively contribute to the global non-proliferation regime, on an equal footing, as full member of NSG. This aspiration is based on a) the desire to strengthen global non-proliferation regime b) the need for strategic stability and level playing field in South Asia c) priority for socio-economic development and d) the capability to supply NSG Part-1 and 2 items.
The author is on the visiting faculty of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
Ms. Haleema Saadia
Topic: – Pakistan’s Credentials for NSG Membership
NSG is a membership of 48 countries all of whom are NPT state parties. It was created in response to India’s action of using nuclear material, provided for peaceful purposes, to prepare nuclear weapons. NSG controls entire global nuclear exports and it is a supplier’s cartel where there is no treaty but an informal voluntary arrangement between countries. All the states take decisions through consensus, they do coordinate their export controls and a lot of information sharing takes place. For 30 years the non NPT states could not conduct civil nuclear cooperation with the NSG states neither could they have NSG membership. This, however, changed when India was given a waiver in 2008. In May last year India and Pakistan applied for NSG membership. Pakistan is one of the pioneer states which setup a nuclear power plant. It is the first Muslim country to construct and operate a civil nuclear power plant, while being 15th in the world. Pakistan has more than five decades of experience in maintaining and operating nuclear reactors, also, all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards.
It is estimated that by 2035 Pakistan will require 100,000MW to 170,000MW of electricity in comparison our current capacity is at 25,000 MW. Pakistan’s government has devised a plan that 2030 we will be producing 8800MW of electricity through nuclear energy. Pakistan is one of the very few countries in the world which operates a complete nuclear fuel cycle form uranium mining, milling to use in reactor to waste disposal or reprocessing.
We are manufacturing spares for pressurized water reactors and also pressurized heavy water reactors. We produce and operate heavy water plants and we produce our own heavy water.
Pakistan is using nuclear technology in agriculture and bio-technology. There are 4 institutes which are working in this regard. So far 89 different crop varieties have been developed. Integrated Pest management is being used to control pests, which involve involves the Sterile insect technique (SIT) and Male annihilation technique (MAT). Work is being done to increasing soil fertility and measuring soil moisture.
Work is being done relating to animal husbandry, and producing certain indigenous plants which can be placed into marginal lands, also work is being done on meals ready to eat (MRE) technology which is receiving great importance in the world.
PAEC runs 18 medical centers which provide cancer treatment to almost 80% of the country’s cancer patients. Out of these, 80% are treated free of charge.
Commitment to Non Proliferation
Pakistan identifies itself as a reluctant nuclear power, as it became a nuclear power only for its survival. This can be backed by the fact that Pakistan made several proposals before 1998 to keep the region nuclear free. For almost 24 years Pakistan sponsored a resolution in the United Nations for establishment of nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Many proposals were made but India refused them all. In regard to Nonproliferation, after Pakistan became a nuclear power it upheld the resolve to nonproliferation. Pakistan nuclear CBMs approach is built on two objectives; one is the promotion of strategic stability in the region and it encompasses nuclear missile restraints. The second one is conventional balance and conflict resolution, based on which Pakistan came up with the strategic restraint regime which has been on the table for over two decades but has faced resistance from India.
Session – II
Mr. Khalid Banuri
Former DG ACDA SPD
Remarks of Chairman
Reflecting on Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal’s speech Mr. Khalid Banuri stated:
There are strategic changes that are taking place and those changes are linked to the military industrial complex and this builds around the politics of NSG. The destabilizing factor is the discrimination which affects regional stability due to factors which will happen anyway as states will makes changes to their strategies from their own national perspectives and military industrial complexes will try to take as much economic benefit from it as they possibly can. Discrimination, however, will cause regional instability.
Mr. Khalid Banuri’s views on Dr. Rizwana Abbasi’s speech:
The basic question remains of normalizing nonproliferation as it is multi-faceted. Pakistan needs to understand that post 2008 waiver, India is increasingly dismissive of Pakistan’s concerns and this is something that Pakistan needs to deal with. The question of normalizing under trump administration is much more complicated as it is hard to understand the Trump administration and its policies.
Mr. Khalid Banuri’s comments:
In an ever changing environment, past is becoming obsolete and new strategies have to be developed in the right context. In an environment where there are weapons of mass destruction and a dire need for peaceful use of technology, one needs to think along new lines and then these thoughts need to be framed into context which may be economic growth or the size of the economy which in turn will determine the future of the economy itself. Some economists have predicted that by 2030 Pakistan will be 18th largest economy in the world. They base this prediction on the potential available to Pakistan, provided that it is utilized properly.
- More awareness is required at various levels and times. Gaps need to be bridged. Policy perspectives are generally generated in the capital cities all over the world. People pondering over these perspectives need to understand what it is and are there any questions
- Learn the terminologies. If you do not learn the terminologies you will miss important details
- Use the right words and phrase in the right manner
- Issue of politics and technology. Decision making is political regardless of the technical requirements
- NSG is not directly under international law. It has its own rules
- We need to learn more about Pakistan’s strategic export control legislation
- Accept that 100% non-proliferation is not possible
- Stringent export controls are required
Prof. Dr. Tanweer Khalid
Former Chairperson Dept. of Political Science Karachi University
Topic: – Politics of NSG and Non-NPT States
The international community works collectively to promote peace and prevent conflicts between states for which it outlines objectives and procedures so that a proper environment is made to exist on the basis of equal participation of all states whether big or small. Preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons by states which do not already possess them is currently one of the central policy objectives of the international community. The need for implementing more effective measures to achieve the objective have taken on a new urgency with the growing risk of spread of proliferation-related technologies more widely. Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of IAEA commented that ‘countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction ‘1. The NPT (nonproliferation treaty) was signed in 1968 by several major nuclear and non- nuclear starters in the context of the nuclear arms race and mounting international concern on the consequences of a nuclear war. The treaty though not successful in prevention did set a precedent for international cooperation in this field. After USA and the then Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, leaders of both the countries hoped that more comprehensive agreements on arms control will be forthcoming. Both powers had an interest in negotiating agreements to slow the pace of arms race and limit competition in strategic weapons development in view of the excessive costs involved. Thus the agreement of NPT was signed.
As the science of fusing and exploding atoms entered public literature nuclear technology was no longer pursued by only governments but private companies as well. As a result there were five nuclear powers in addition to the US,USSR and U.K by 1964.France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, People’s Republic of China in 1964 and many others were technologically advanced enough to build one when decided .But while both sides were conscious of’ Mutually assured destruction ‘in case of use of nuclear weaponry, the Doctrine of Detterence was reasonably maintained.However if more developing nations ,on the periphery of the balance of power between the Cold War super powers achieved nuclear capability ,the balance could be disturbed. Particularly if countries with volatile border disputes became capable then the odds of a nuclear war was to have global repercussions..With this perspective in view the difficult problem began of bringing non- nuclear nations in line with a workable treaty by asking nations which had not yet developed nuclear technology to give up all intentions of doing so with a vow by nuclear powers not to transfer the technology. The result was the NPT (non – proliferation treaty)
It was heralded as an important step in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons but:
1 France and China did not sign
- A number of non- nuclear stares too did not sign thereby limiting their own future programs .These were Argentina ,Brazil ,India ,Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Africa
The NPT in its original form was unfair that only five winning powers of the 11 World War will have nuclear weapons. Those who objected wanted that either they too should de-nuclearize or else others should also have the same rights. To some like Robert IGray, the former US arms control negotiator, the NPT was an agreement as important as the UN charter but many believed that it was battered and in need of strengthening.The example of Korea leaving the agreement at will ,highlighted the risk that countries can engage in proliferation-sensitive activities such as fuel- making and fuel reprocessing ,transparently and under safeguards but the apply the same techniques for military purposes,. Korea was the first state to withdraw from the NPT in 2003. Analysts drew attention to the risk that additional breakouts from NPT may destabilize the regional and global security environment. When India conducted her first nuclear test in 1974,code named ‘ Smiling Buddha’ the government of Indira Gandhi wanted to project the nuclear explosion as purely for civilian and peaceful purposes on 18may 1974, the day when the test was conducted was Buddha Purnima 2.It instigated a wave of international criticism for breaching the trust and commitment towards non-proliferation. Assurances and projections of Indian Prime minister that it was a peaceful test did not work. Major treaties pertaining to the nuclear aspect at that time were:
Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ABM 1972
One of the aftermaths of the nuclear explosion was creation of the NSG when seven nuclear supplier governments were convinced that the NPT alone was not adequate to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The NSG was formed over a course of three decades and it has become the world’s leading multilateral export control arrangement establishing guidelines that cover transfer of nuclear – related materials, equipment and technology. The 48 members of the NSG form a voluntary consensus -based organization and can be called an informal arrangement in the sense that cooperation among the participants is not laid down in a binding instrument under international law and is thus politically binding. Though not based on an international treaty it works on appropriate guidelines which are consistent with and complement the various international instruments in the field of nuclear non- proliferation.3 these treaties are: –
- Nonproliferation treaty
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America
- Treaty of Rarotonga ( s.pacific nuclear weapons free zone treaty)
4 Treaty of Pelindaba (the African nuclear weapons -free zone treaty)
5 Treaty of Bangkok (S.E.Asia nuclear weapons free zone treaty)
The NSG works through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear -related exports which envisage restraints beyond those provided in the NPT.It also decided in 1992 to establish guidelines for transfer of nuclear -related dual -use equipment, material and technology which could make a significant contribution to an unsafe guarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.These guidelines also are a full scope safeguards agreement with IAEA.In 1993
NSG meeting at Lucerne an amendment of application of NSG guidelines on all current and future nuclear activities for Non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) was made asking members to adopt full scope safeguards as soon as possible. The NSG was able to include states which were not parties to the NPT and since the NSG was not directly associated with the text of the NPT participating states were able to take a more flexible and extensive approach to developing a list of items subject to agreed guidelines. But since most of the efforts at the international level between states tend to bend towards the political rather than the legal considerations, parties of the NPT were concerned that excessive control of NSG on nuclear technology could undermine the right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear technology as underlined in article 1V of the NPT.4 Since most parties to the NPT had no nuclear weapons aspirations they stressed that export control should not reduce the prospects of economic development and free trade. After formulating the guidelines the NSG did not institutionalize the cooperation which was the result of the opposition it met by developing countries who saw the NSG as a ‘ supplier cartel ‘ undermining ‘ the ‘bargain’ principle of the NPT between the nuclear haves and have- nots.
Approval of NSG membership depends on five criteria:
- Capability to supply the goods listed in the NSG guidelines
- Willingness to apply these guidelines
- Existence and implementation of a national export control regime compatible
With NSG rules and is legally binding
- Membership in NPT or compatible regional agreement
- Willingness to support international efforts for non-proliferation of WMD’s 5
It has been observed that NSG’s effectiveness and credibility has been directly challenged by the willingness of established suppliers in the group to break and bend its guidelines in the service of their national security and economic interests. From its inception the NSG facilitated legitimate trade by reducing the risk that nuclear cooperation would contribute to nuclear proliferation with a view that without strengthened controls nuclear trade for peaceful purposes will become politically unacceptable to suppliers who will be at a trade disadvantage. Thus with agreed guidelines it was made clear that each decision rests with the responsible authorities in the exporting state and that mere adherence to NPT do not alone guarantee nuclear supply. But since 1998 the NSG guidelines have been challenged by supplier states engaged in what one expert called ‘ opportunistic, state supported nuclear commerce’6..Since the last decade there is a transformation in international nuclear trade and export -control arrangements of NSG which have been subjected to modification and enhancement because of the loopholes in its guidelines. States imported partially manufactured items and material which though, not falling specifically within the control list, could be used for nuclear development.
In 2004 NSG included in its guidelines a ‘catch all’ rule which meant to provide a national legal basis to control export of nuclear -related items not on the control list, when such items can be used for a weapons program.7 But it failed to halt transactions in all cases because determined exporters were prepared to violate national export control laws.8 and it was considered a ‘ stop-gap ‘ agreement. When the NSG was founded, ,initially all trade involved point to point transactions but since the 1980’s proliferators have increasingly transshipped goods to their final destinations via intermediate locations in countries with weak export controls and organized complex transactions are difficult for authorities to detect. These transactions often have multiple intermediary destinations called’ turntables’ and complex payment schemes.9 Such increasing reliance of proliferators on complex transactions is a greater challenge for NSG than ever before because global expectations about the future of nuclear power are changing. Many countries that currently generate nuclear activity now plan to significantly expand their nuclear infrastructure and are not participating in NSG outreach activities( Algeria, Bangladesh ,Jordon, Libya, Morocco, Egypt. ,Ecuador, Ghana, Oman, Qatar, Nigeria, Phillipines, S.Arabia, Thailand and Venezuela). Some developing countries objected to the lack of transparency in an NSG outreach seminar in 1997 which mostly belonged to the NAM (non-aligned movement) expressing that the guidelines were being arbitrarily interpreted and that all denials were put to states outside the NSG. The guidelines thus closed some loopholes in the non-proliferation regime but disparities remained in export policies of NSG members. Canada and the United States required comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply but others did not. As a result NPT non -parties such as Argentina and Brazil, played one supplier against the other by giving lucrative contracts not requiring comprehensive safeguards. The lacuna enabled aspirants like Pakistan and Iraq to obtain items from European and other industrial states for their nuclear programs. Iran, supported by NAM states, objected to interference in its nuclear development from 2003 when its safeguard compliance was under IAEA review. The objections were magnified when US and other supplier states contributed to the failure of NPT Review conference in 2005 because to it the focus of non-proliferation was outside the NPT meaning resting with the NSG ,Proliferation Security Initiative PSI,UNSC resolution 1540,G-8 Global partnership and its own counter proliferation. President Obama’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy in 2009 contributed to the outcome that in2010 NPT Review conference did not run aground on north-south polarization. This conference encouraged states to have their own agreed guidelines and understandings on export controls. However it urged technology holders to give
‘Preferential treatment’ to NPT non-nuclear weapons states and developing countries. This was because of NSG’s ‘ exception decision’ for India in 2008. IAEA Director, Mohammed El Baradei openly endorsed the US-India deal in 2006. (10) He also expressed the view that in the interest of non- discrimination ,Israel and Pakistan should be included by the NSG as partners in the nuclear trade regime alongside India since our ‘traditional strategy of treating such states as outsiders is no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold’. 11 Russia. France, USA and Japan were all prepared to be potential suppliers to India. The participating governments in the various informal sessions on new membership of NSG were arm-twisted by the United States of America in their haste for initiating nuclear commerce with India. The US also gave a strong argument for the waiver insisting that being given the favor India will undertake tangible nonproliferation commitment to reciprocate the exception granted to it but India kept on insisting that the waiver should be ‘clean and unconditional’. Countries including Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, Netherland, Norway and Switzerland proposed some conditions and when not accepted the talks broke down because the waiver appeared biased, bilateral and for bilateral gains. President Obama reaffirmed his committed with Prime Minister Namenda Modi to get India into the fold of multilateral regimes including NSG while insisting that all factors to be considered for membership of NSG were not mandatory. Such has been the nature of bias and discrimination in the debate on expansion of membership. It is not known whether the new US administration under Donald Trump would be willing to invest the same amount of political capitol in India’s candidacy like his predecessor. Pakistan has made a strong case of membership in the NSG. The 48 member nuclear club, telling the UN Security Council the exemplary measures it has taken to strengthen nuclear safety, thus expecting a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach. But Pakistan is wary of developments that deny it a fair and equal chance of candidacy. Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi the ,Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN expressed that Pakistan had implemented a comprehensive export control regime, participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process, ratified the 2005 amendment to the convention on physical protection of nuclear material, declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing and reiterated its willingness to translate it into a bilateral arrangement on non- testing with India, all of which established its eligibility to become a NSG member.13 Now admission of Pakistan and India in NSG depends upon the great power politics. If only India is allowed it will be discriminatory and create a strategic imbalance in South Asia.
It can be said that international norms are driven by politics rather than morals. Powerful states enjoy the lures of proliferation under legal emblem by virtue of powerful allies while small states are bound by their commitments to non- proliferation.13 The NSG must constantly update its guidelines so that loopholes are prevented. Expansion of its membership must not mean selective admission and NSG must ensure that crucial decisions affecting the identity of the group are supported by as many members as possible. It has become far more relevant and it must recognize its potential role and make it consistent with current realities.
- ElBaradei.M. ‘Saving ourselves from distruction’ New York Times.12feb2004
- Norris RobertS (1998) India and Pakistan at crossroads,Indian journal of research.
Paripex.vol 5. Issue 10 oct 2016
- Menu of NSG updated on Jan 31,2017
- Art: 4 of NPT
- CSS Analysis in Security policy.Eth Zurich.No 127. Feb 2013.
- Krepan M ‘Is the US – India nuclear cooperation agreement good or bad for proliferation’ Stimson Centre Aug 31,2005 www.stimson.org. cited in Hibbs. M-The future of nuclear supplier’s group,Carnegie Endowment for International peace,Washington DC,2011.
- NSG plenary meeting: Strengthening the nuclear non proliferation regime, Gothenburg, Sweden may 27-28, 2004, www.nuclear suppliers group.orgin Mark Hibbs: The future of nuclear suppliers group
- Hibbs M. ‘The unmaking of a nuclear smuggler’, Bulletin of the atomic scientists
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- Albright D,Brennan P,Scheel A. Detecting and disrupting illicit nuclear trade after A.Q.Khan, Washington Quarterly vol33,no 2, 85-106
- IAEA DG welcomes US- India nuclear deal ,IAEA press release march 2 ,2006 www.IAEA.org
- Baradei El M. ‘ Re thinking Nuclear Safeguards,’Washington Post June 14, 2006
- Umar M. 2016 Pakistan’s case for nuclear suppliers group PKKH. Leading alternative Policy Institute
- Pakistan makes a strong pitch for NSG membership-Maleeha Lodhi.Dawn August25 ,2016
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad
Topic:- Discrimination in Transfer of Technology and South Asian Strategic Stabil
The features of the change in the international politics have become more noticeable during the recent years. Therefore, today, states foreign and strategic policies are in a revamping process. The refurbishing progression, certainly, reshape the strategic partnerships and military alliances in the near future. Perhaps, it intensifies security dilemma puzzle in the international relations, amplify arms race between/among the strategic competitors and affect the existing regional security architectures. The new global geo-political landscape is evolving and thereby necessitates the understanding of the shifts and priorities of the Great Powers for constituting promising foreign and strategic policy and transfer of technology to their allies. The trends indicate that militarily capable nations would remain important actors in shaping the new global geo-political landscape and determining the strategic environment of regions, such as South Asia. In this context transfer of technology, duel use technology or military technology is very deterministic. The South Asian strategic environment is complex, ambiguous, unpredictable and volatile due to the strategic competition between India and Pakistan, and Great Powers interest in its adjacent regions. The Great Powers have been engaging the South Asian states for the pursuit of their global strategic objectives since the end of Cold War. The strategic engagement between South Asian actors and Great powers has increased since the Americans announcement of pivot or rebalances strategy in Asia-Pacific constituted in 2011-12 to contain China in Asia-Pacific and Russia’s assertive military actions in Crimea, Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015. It was reported in Russia’s National Security Strategy (a fundamental document of strategic planning) that Kremlin seriously sees an imminent threat of armed conflict with the United States and its allies. The US is allegedly threatening Russia in the West, in the East and in the Arctic. Europeans imposed tough sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of Crimea annexation.
The People’s Republic of China is one of the fastest growing Great Power in 2017. In Asia-Pacific, China has been developing powerful forces capable of deterring and defeating aggression of any state, including United States. Since 2015, it has been signaling that in South China Sea it would not accept external actors interference. It seems determined to monitor the navigation operations in the South China Sea and continue developing bases on its Islands in the Sea. This assertive Beijing’s strategy has alarmed the Island claimants in the region, such as Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc.`The US Department of Defense (DOD) has working on ‘Defense Innovation Initiative’, which included the Third Offset Strategy since November 2014. In addition, DOD has been investing in modernizing its nuclear arsenals and also maturing the missile defense system. For improving its’ allies confidence, Washington has been assisting them in improving their military capabilities.On June 4, 2016, Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States declared China’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region destabilizing. He stated: “As a result, China’s actions in the South China Sea are isolating it, at a time when the entire region is coming together and networking.” He added: “Unfortunately, if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.” He pointed out that Asia-Pacific security network includes bilateral, trilateral and multilateral arrangements. South Asian states are equally eager for cooperation with the Great Powers to sustain their regional autonomy and purchase high-tech military hardware. Neither India nor Pakistan is advanced in military know-how. Therefore, both states are depended on the developed nations for military hardware purchases and relevant transfer of technologies. The alarming fact is the unlikelihood of arms control between New Delhi and Islamabad. Thus, both states continue manufacturing military hardware indigenously and purchasing weaponry from the technologically advanced nations. In this context, India is in an advantageous position due to its economic growth.
Presently, India is endeavoring to institute its “preemptive nuclear counter force” capability. Coupled with Cold Start Doctrine and proactive military operation strategy at the limited conventional war. On May 20, 2017, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi government permitted local private companies to work with foreign players to make high-tech defense equipment in India. At the same time, New Delhi also announced to spend $250 billion on the modernization of its armed forces over the next decade. Indeed, New Delhi armed forces modernization scheme is very attractive for the military industrial complex. Simultaneously, it is alarming for the South Asian Strategic en vironment. The Great Powers selectively transfer sophisticated technology to improve their allies’ indigenous research and development military programs. The selective-cum-discriminatory approach of the transfer of technology is perilous for the regional strategic stability. It not only undermines the arms race stability but also subvert the conflict sustainability between/among the belligerents. Which is prerequisite for deterrence stability between the belligerent nuclear capable states. In theory, the discriminatory transfer of technology policy of the supplier nation in a nuclearized region lowers the nuclear threshold. Precisely, increases the chances of conventional war into nuclear exchanges or war. Since end of Cold War and shift in India’s foreign policy in 1992, New Delhi has been receiving technological assistance from the developed world. New Delhi shunned its indigenous technological driven programs, especially indigenously military buildup programs for the modernization of its armed forces. India’s willingness to purchase military hardware from the military technologically advanced nations makes it attractive for the American and European military industrial complexes. The United States’ South Asian transfer of technology policy is very selective and discriminatory since the end of Cold War. It has been transferring both nuclear and space know-how to India on the pretext of peaceful applications of these technologies. Whereas, both nuclear and space technologies are duel use. The recipient state comfortably convert their civilian nuclear and space programs into nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
Importantly, the state having uranium enrichment or reactor spent fuel-reprocessing facility is capable to upgrade these facilities to manufacture fissile material for the devices. Similarly, the state having space program and is capable to launch satellite launchers can modify these launchers with reentry vehicles and appropriate targeting systems to convert them into ballistic missiles. More precisely, space launch vehicle programs could be used to conceal ballistic missiles buildup.The United States led western world not only expressed its willingness to sell military hardware to India but in certain cases they agreed to transfer the duel use technology to India, i.e. nuclear and missile including the ballistic missile defense systems. The American nuclear commercial lobby realized that India is big market for its nuclear reactor industry. Similarly, the American space enclave decided to capture India’s big space market. For uninterrupted transfer of material as well as technology to India, the Bush Administration amended the United States Foreign Assistance Act 1954. And also is facilitating, India in getting the waiver by the Nuclear Supplier Group in September 2008. The Obama Administration had expedited the Bush Administration pro-India approach. It announced to make India member of four important multinational technological cartels i.e. Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. In April 2016, Washington facilitated India’s entry into Missile Technology Control Regime. Since June 2016, United States and its likeminded states have been lobbying for its membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group. India and United States also concluded the logistic support agreement Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement in August 2016, to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment/replacement of supplies. The United States strategic partnership with India is gradually creating military imbalance in the regional strategic environment. The transformation in military power entailing military asymmetry between the strategic competitors encourages the advantageous state to launch a preventive war against the adversary. Paradoxically, the Washington primary objective is to build India militarily to check the Chinese rise in Asia, while India is determined to advance its military muscle to establish its hegemony in South Asia. New Delhi’s hegemonic aspiration maybe acceptable to the smaller neighbors of India, but Pakistan is unwavering to sustain its sovereign stature in the international community particularly in South Asian strategic environment. Pakistan’s endeavor to sustain the strategic equilibrium with its limited financial resources and indigenous nuclear weapons program certainly frustrate Indian ruling elite and strategic community. The frustration of the Indians has been multiplied during the recent years due Indian armed forces failure to restore the writ of state in the Indian Occupied Kashmir.
The unsettled chronic Kashmir dispute resulted in three wars and numerous border skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
Since the nuclearization of South Asia neither border conflict escalate nor total war break out at the international border between India and Pakistan. The absence of war between India and Pakistan is due to the continuity of strategic equilibrium between the belligerent neighbors. Importantly, even the India leadership’s irresponsible destabilizing claim about the conduct of strategic strikes in September 2016, did not spiral into lethal border conflict. To conclude, the discrimination in transfer of technology by Great Powers, especially United States to India is posing a serious challenge to the strategic equilibrium in South Asia. It has unleashed lethal arms race between India and Pakistan, which is dangerous for conflict sustainability. Thus, arms race between nuclearized belligerent states may lower the nuclear threshold, which is perilous to the South Asia Strategic Stability.
Dr Rizwana Karim Abbasi
National Defence University, Islamabad
Topic: – Normalizing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in the 21st Century
There are three pertinent issues that relate to current realities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and need to be understood.
One, the evolution of nuclear technology in 1945 introduced revolution in military affairs thereby changing the notion of war fighting into war avoidance because of the catastrophic potential that this weapon carried. As a result, the world was kept from reoccurrence of another total war. Notably, nuclear deterrent factor was not the only determining factor that averted major confrontation between the two arch rivals such as the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. There were a range of additional convincing intervening variables that regulated states’ behavior towards nuclear war avoidance. First, the US and Soviet’s shared monopoly in bombs efficiency and sufficiency and their competing war fighting strategies, economic balance, political stability and their shared influence to project power beyond their regions played a significant role. Second, these states developed rational strategic behavior and tolerance to learn living with the bomb without employing it over time. This was also guided by ideational factors in which local communities, civil societies and academic community contributed tremendously in exerting pressure on the elites’ mind set to understand consequences of nuclear war thereby making it publicly unacceptable. Finally, the two states global similar strategic and, political directions and innovation of new conventional technologies convinced the two super powers to move away from non-conventional to conventional technologies by building trust and negotiating arms control arrangements thus considering no space for victory in a nuclear war. For this reason, up to this date, the major war fighting role was assigned to conventional technologies globally.
Two, in the 1950s, in parallel to considering nuclear technologies for military purposes, the world was also exposed to this technology for peaceful purposes as an alternate source to fossil fuel. Thus the demand for effective control of nuclear energy to ensure that it is used only for peaceful purposes was one of the first issues addressed by the United Nations when it was established in 1946. The Atom for peace resulted into the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology thereby ensuring an oversight through the provision of safeguards that this technology does not diverts for military purposes. However, many believe that Atoms for Peace was a mere propaganda exercise. It was mainly intended to distract attention away from Eisenhower’s commitment to the use, expansion, and improvement of increasingly lethal nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, the IAEA’s safeguard then became a powerful tool in facilitating the process peaceful uses of technology. As a result, the developed countries started establishing and operationalizing nuclear power plants in the 1950s. The nuclear power industry grew exponentially in the 1960s because it was cost-effective, environmentally clean and safe. The powerful countries met their demand but growth nonetheless, stalled in the late 1970s and throughout 1980s. This stagnation resulted due to various events such as Three Mile Island in the US, Chernobyl in Russia and decline in oil prices and growing public pressure in industrial nations pointing towards negative impact of nuclear reactors on the environment and communities and finally fears of nuclear proliferation.
Three, in parallel to the debate on peaceful uses, concerns on proliferation of nuclear weapons generated discussions among the then relevant policy and strategic circles to introduce mechanisms on non-proliferation to controlling the spread of nuclear technology for military purposes. This resulted in the creation of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), making it the most powerful tool of the non-proliferation regime without any legal legitimacy attached. The states struck agreements on the three articles that remained treaty’s bargaining pillars such as non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament and rest of the article became procedural ones. Since then the major focus remained on promoting non-proliferation whereas the former two pillars remained deliberately marginalized. Thus later in 1974, the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, a highly significant pillar of the NPT was drawn out of the formal mechanism in form of NSG with no legal legitimacy and oversight attached. When such mechanisms lack legal oversight, the chances of violations become high as states can modify the rules as they deem appropriate.
Where is the world heading to?
In the 1970s, the global political order was different when these non-proliferation treaties and regimes were established with considerable loopholes attached thus embracing different rules for different states. Promises were made in the NPT treaty in the second half of the 19th century that have not yet come to pass. No progress has been made towards disarmament shedding invisible light of hope. The treaty failed to create balance between non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. Violations occurred in this treaty by those who committed against it. The promises were broken and rules modified within the regime from time to time to legitimize some states’ interests. The Indo-US nuclear deal is a case in point. The contention is that the world would have reformulated the NPT rules under the NPT review conference in 2005 by rearranging a criterion for newly emerging states considering their emerging security and energy demands. However, considering its strategic and economic interests in view under Indian pressure and lobby, the US in 2008 finalized the deal without realizing and casting the consequences of this deal thereby violating the spirit and structure of the NPT. Pakistan should have protested extensively to stop this deal but Pakistan diplomatically failed to generate pressure to scuttle the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008.
Contention is that the global system remains very much in flux today. The global power blocks are shifting, war of ideas and narratives is gaining deeper space thus becoming more resilient in the contemporary global order. Indeed apace for nuclear war is shrinking, whereas conventional smarter, sophisticated and supersonic technologies are gaining more space. In the backdrop of changing system, shifting poles and evolving power politics and innovation of new technologies, the world’s rules have to be redefined for the reasons highlighted below. One, interest in nuclear energy has reemerged; the process of globalization has created inter-regional connectivity with increased interdependence of states thereby connecting regional economic with global economies. Today, economic power house has shifted to Asia and we witness unprecedented population and economic growth in Asia. Energy consumption level has exponentially increased in Asia and nuclear energy has become a gap filer in energy calculus of a nation. Two, greenhouse gasses are detrimental to the environment that impose irreversible damage and severely impact human life. The UN estimate suggests the global greenhouse gasses emission must be cut by 70 percent by 2050 if we are to avoid the catastrophic change to our planet’s climate system. Three, fossil fuel imposes a heavy financial burden and demand wide-ranging and costly cleanup methods. Four, climate change will rise substantially, and rapidly over time. Thus, nuclear energy is cheaper environmental friendly and safer that offers a cheapest, fastest and greater capacity factor. Human security against heat wave is at risk, socio-economic sustainability and growth is at danger and plagues our societies in South Asia. There are 31 countries that operate nuclear power program and 40 percent of them are developing countries. There are 14 reported states that are planning to initiate nuclear power programs. India and Pakistan are a part of this process. India and Pakistan are two established nuclear weapons states. When NPT was created these were non nuclear weapon states. In 2017, these are mature, rational and established nuclear weapon states with second strike capability, accurate and sophisticated war fighting strategies and weapon systems. Both are enhancing their nuclear learning, efficiency and effectiveness as time passes by. The two states have left the world speculations behind in terms of managing and safeguarding their export control regimes and their arsenals. The world has now no option but to follow a new mechanism to accommodate the newly emerging states’ security and energy demand as guided by the NPT Review conference 2010 calling upon all states party to the treaty to ‘facilitate in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty and that due consideration be given to the need of developing countries.
NSG politics of South Asia What does India want?
The narrative that persists in India is that it wants to bridge the gap between energy supply and demand. It also considers the need for green sustainable economic development. At present there are 21 reported operational nuclear reactors in India. In the overall construct of energy generation, India aims at producing 200,000 MW by 2050. In India 7 reactors of 53 MW capacities are under construction, 18 are planned for the next phase of expansion, and about 63 are proposed that are expected to become operational by 2035. Indeed in the backdrop of 2008 NSG waiver, Indian nuclear energy program has rapidly expanded opening up new gateways to get access to global commerce. After securing this waiver, India has struck deals with a large number of states thereby securing benefits of the NPT states. This is why the Indian scholars claim that they have already been mainstreamed. Now India desperately wants to gain global status as a recognized nuclear weapon state via the NSG. This would result into offering India a pedestal favorable to secure permanent membership in the UNSC. Through global mainstreaming, India have been given advantageous position to rapidly modernize its technologies towards achieving nuclear efficiency, effectiveness and sufficiency with no aims and plans of placing its reactors under the IAEA’s safeguards.
What does Pakistan want?
Indeed, Pakistan also wants to bridge gap between energy supply and demand without competing with India in this field. Pakistan wants to secure energy to preserve human security in the backdrop of climate change, rising heat wave and for sustainable socio-economic development. Indeed, it offers a greater capacity factor, lower cost and environmentally safe source to Pakistan. Global mainstreaming for commerce and recognition as a NWS would build trust and have stabilizing effects between Pakistan and Group members. It will help Pakistan continue to play a role as a responsible state in the global securitization process.
How can regime be normalized under the Trump Administration?
First, it is important to note that are less chances of normalization of the regime, as the US is still the most powerful actor and will continue to dominate and regulate the global institutions. Nevertheless, President Trump has the greater opportunity to set his political legacy to save the world. Shortly after taking office, the president directed a new Nuclear Posture Review to ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure their allies. They should minimize the use of nuclear weapons in national security otherwise it would set a new precedent. More so, the entire nuclear order would shift if Japan and South Korea go nuclear in the backdrop of crisis they experience in the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the world must predict how would they deal with these virtual NWS if they go nuclear? It is required that the NPT and NSG become flexible considering new world realities and recognizing the need of India and Pakistan. For long, Pakistan had been proposing to create a new regime to give recognized states status to India and Pakistan. I propose that the NSG can be revised thereby recognizing the status of India-and Pakistan as member states thus formally legitimizing and attaching the group to the NPT.
What course of Action should Pakistan adopt?
Many of the environmental problems that Pakistan faces today are the outcome of fossil fuel dependence. Pakistan needs to invest extensively on understanding global warming that is a major emerging threat to our national security. Pakistan should take these issues to the universities, build global cooperation and invent strategies to deal with this threat and make the world aware of these urgencies. Since, the entire world is moving away from fossil fuel to clean energy, thus Pakistan should not be dictated to adopt the reverse course of action. To secure membership in the NSG more focus should be on diplomatic efforts, external balancing and engagement, and through material investment outwardly without any further delays. Pakistan has to immediately craft innovative counter narrative strategies to win the adversary without thinking of fighting war.